Wednesday, May 6, 2020
A Critical Analysis of the Operational Performance of General Vo Nguyen Giap free essay sample
The paper commences with an outline of his background, before detailing the command requirements made of him during the campaign. The Hersey-Blanchard model is explained, and then compared against Giapââ¬â¢s leadership method. From teenage activist to general 4. Vo Nguyen Giap was born to a peasant family in 1911. At that time Vietnam was almost entirely a rural nation. Aside from the cities of Hanoi and Saigon, population concentrations were based on small villages serviced by provincial capitals. Villages were most often small clusters of homesteads, and were particularly concentrated in the vicinity of the two major rivers in the nation, the Mekong in the south and the Red in the north. Vo Nguyenââ¬â¢s village, An-Xa was located in QuangBinh province. 5 This was one of the poorest regions in Vietnam, and interestingly located adjacent to the 17th parallel, which was later to become the focus of national division. 6 5. Vo Nguyen was raised in a strongly nationalistic family that placed a high priority on education. His father was highly respected within the region both for his participation in the resistance to French rule in the 1880s, and his application to studies. He ensured that his son received a balanced education that incorporated traditional Confucian Vietnamese content and values. 7 Giap became well versed in the rising nationalism of the time, and was noted as a fervent and enthusiastic student of the subject. 8 He demonstrated a particular interest in modes of political thought, and was especially attracted to the works of Lenin, Marx, Engels, and Mao Tse-Tung. He would later become an influential leader in the Vietnamese Communist Party. 19 GEDDES PAPERS 2005 6. Throughout his youth Vo Nguyenââ¬â¢s capacity as a student was demonstrated with his selection for continued studies at local and French academies. This was highly unusual at the time, the majority of the Vietnamese population being illiterate, and only the smallest percentage going past primary school. He was eventually awarded degrees in Law and political economics, and was noted as a student of particular intelligence. He had a considerable ability to dominate others using an adept thought process, and could quickly interpret the intent of others. He had a developed capacity to listen and debate, but also an innate ability to pull back so that points of contention would not become significant obstacles. 10 Whilst a post-graduate student, Vo Nguyen was also a university lecturer. He was highly respected for his ability to instruct in history, particularly military history. This mainly self instructed historical knowledge was the largest portion of Giapââ¬â¢s military experience prior to assuming his first command responsibilities. 11 7. Giapââ¬â¢s distinctive nature represented a synthesis of many pressures. The system of community independence, local dependency, and loyalty within which he was raised was ââ¬Ënaturallyââ¬â¢ at odds with imposed French authority. The many individual nationalistic influences he had in his early life reinforced these ââ¬Ënaturalââ¬â¢ values, recognisable later as the pillars of his idealism. He saw communism as the solution to the complexity which industrialisation had apparently presented to Vietnam and the world, and deeply desired change in Vietnam. Additionally his education, capacity as a student, and his experience within academic circles had left him a capable and influential individual at many levels. This facility, his passionate belief in communism, and his ability to influence those around him were enduring capabilities. Experiences of his youth had prepared him well to adapt to a military environment and for survival within the communist party. Giap and commandââ¬ârevolution in Vietnam 8. The communistsââ¬â¢ plan to expel the French was intended to follow a pattern of a threestage revolution; contention, equilibrium, and counteroffensive. Each stage demanded particular philosophical conditions to be met before the next; however, the measure of each was indistinct. It required the communist leadership to gauge the readiness of the population for additional challenge and hardship, a difficult subjective determination. 12 This complexity was intrinsic to the environment within which Giap was to lead. Contention 9. In 1940 Giap was commissioned by Ho Chi Minh to develop political consciousness amongst the peasants in the north of Vietnam. This focus was then extended to raising and training the first element of a formalised ââ¬Ëcontentionââ¬â¢ to the French occupation: a guerilla force. 3 Giap did not however experience immediate operational success with his guerillas. His cells were poorly armed, and lacked the quality needed to extend a real operational effect. It was 1942 before Giap could make some impact with his new forces, but even then it was only through minor activity. 14 Over the next three years, however, he improved the size and capability of this force, extending guerilla operations across the entire northern region of Vietnam, and significantly disrupting the French occupation. 5 He also led guerilla operations against the Japanese, an action that gained the Vietnamese communists direct support from the USA and UK, together with additional aid from the Chinese communists. 16 This was a significant and important achievement in the absence of other leaders, and particularly of Ho Chi Minh. 17 Equilibrium 10. As guerilla activity increasingly impacted upon the French, Giap recognised there was a need for larger-scale activity to ensure the achievement of the ââ¬Ëequilibriumââ¬â¢ stage of revolution. He 20 A CRiTiCAL ANALySiS OF ThE OPERATiONAL PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL VO NGUyEN GiAP 1940ââ¬â1954 elieved a succession of small victories, achieved by periodically concentrating his guerillas, would have a damning effect on his enemy. 18 In 1944 Giap raised the first regular platoon of the ââ¬ËVietminhââ¬â¢ and Ho Chi Minh, wanting to increase popular support for the revolution, instructed Giap to attack static French targets. Successful, Giap was overwhelmed with new recruits for his developing main force,19 the Vietminh quickly building in size during the remainder of the Japanese occupation. By the middle of 1945 Giap was commanding a regular force numbering 10 000. 20 11. With the end of WWII and the return of Vietnam to French control, Giapââ¬â¢s total force of Vietminh and guerillas numbered altogether around 30 000,21 but despite considerable achievements, including the capture of Hanoi from the Japanese, they were still very inexperienced in conventional warfare. 22 By 1947 Giap had organised his main force into divisions, and in 1948 was commanding small, relatively successful campaigns involving up to nine battalions. Having gained in experience, he began his concerted effort to push French forces from the Tonkin region of north Vietnam. On 16 September 1950 he conducted a successful attack on the Don Khe outpost using wave assaults and massed indirect fire. He followed up on 9 October with an attack on a second post, Cao Bang, as relief in place was being conducted. This was later regarded as the worst defeat the French had suffered in their history of colonialism. 23 Counteroffensive 12. By 1951 Giapââ¬â¢s considerable command extended over five divisions, 12 Artillery Regiments, eight Engineer Regiments, an additional 37 ââ¬ËRegionalââ¬â¢ Battalions, guerilla forces across all the northern reaches of Vietnam, and enormous numbers of porters logistically supporting his main force. 4 With this now significant capability, Giap attempted to follow up his 1950 successes. In what was considered the first move of a ââ¬Ëcounteroffensiveââ¬â¢ he attacked Vinh Yen, north-west of Hanoi, with two divisions. This attack failed, however, and he sustained very heavy casualties. 25 Giap later failed in set battles on two other occasions in 1951 whilst attempting to clear the Red River Delta. He attacked Mao Khe in March, and along the Day River in June. On both occasions he was repelled. The first ââ¬Ëcounteroffensiveââ¬â¢ had failed. 26 13. In 1953 Vietnamese strategic advisers identified a unique opportunity. International negotiations surrounding the future of Vietnam presented the opportunity to exploit the declining support of the French population for the war in Indo-China. Giap recognised that the French disposition was centring on Dien Bien Phu and he chose this location to next confront the French. This was a significant challenge, especially given recent losses and Giapââ¬â¢s own concerns regarding the experience of his troops. 27 The final solution involved a whole-of-force activity. Giap encircled the position, and steadily concentrated his assault and supporting forces. He projected diversionary moves into other regions creating the impression of confused objectives, succeeded in diluting French concentration, and weakened their support lines. He also continued guerilla and local harassing activity throughout. 28 When the attack was finally launched his forces had created comprehensive conditions for success. This battle, fought on many fronts, was the event that finally led to the expulsion of the French from Vietnam. Vo Nguyen Giap could no longer be considered just a guerilla leader. The evolution of relations 14. That Giap was well respected by Ho Chi Minh is clear. His rapid rise within the Party, and direct application to difficult tasks throughout the revolution, clearly demonstrated this. Similarly, he had great respect for Ho Chi Minh and his revolutionary vision, but it was with his subordinates that Giap had the most successful interaction. 29 In his early days he had galvanised small villages to 21 GEDDES PAPERS 2005 the cause of revolution. His approach succeeded in generating very great momentum; by the time of Dien Bien Phu he had the support of millions of volunteers supporting his Vietminh forces despite the extreme measures which the French employed. Giap was ruthless in throwing his soldiers against enemy forces in order to achieve his military aims, but he was cognisant of the human toll his battles took. He learnt from his costly mistakes. 30 He developed the capacity to recognise when his soldiers had reached breaking point and was able to adjust his plans accordingly. 31 This combination of subordinate support, mission orientation, and personal understanding was a critical element to Giapââ¬â¢s effectiveness. Effective leadership 15. The essential elements that comprise effective leadership are both subjective and controversial. The body of research surrounding the subject is so extensive that it is necessary to provide a relational focus if it is to be successfully utilised within this examination of operational success. Leadership is defined as that combination of task and relationship behaviours employed by an individual to achieve a prescribed outcome. 32 Combinations are unlikely to be static; rather, they are contingent in nature, depending on the task and the personal requirements of individuals involved in achieving the outcome. The effectiveness of leadership within this paradigm can be gauged by the extent to which the leaderââ¬â¢s chosen combination of behaviours assists or detracts from operational outcomes. 33 This is a situational approach to leadership. 34 16. Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard attempted to pattern the situational approach to leadership with their Situational Leadership Model (SLM). Their model is summarised in Figure 1. They divide the spectrum of leadership methods according to measures of relationship and task behaviours, and explain the associated diversity with four basic leadership activities. These are delegating, participating, selling, and telling. In the diagram this is represented within a leader behaviour matrix, the (S4) to (S1) quadrants defined along relationship and task behaviour axes. The appropriate leadership style to be adopted within each situation is then determined by identifying the capability, or readiness, of subordinates to complete the designated task. The relationship between the basic leadership activities and subordinate readiness is inversely proportional. In the diagram the measure of subordinate readiness, high (R4) to low (R1), is depicted below the matrix. The curved line contained within the matrix defines the relationship between leader input and subordinate readiness. This line indicates the appropriate style to be adopted for varying levels of subordinate readiness. 35 17. The SLM was chosen to assist in the critical assessment of Giapââ¬â¢s leadership effectiveness because of the shifting environment he faced in supporting the revolution. Initially he was tasked to generate popular support. He then had to transform this interest to willingness and capability, in order to conduct regional disruptive operations. As the revolution evolved, he then had to raise a conventional army to engage the French in pitched battle, and he finally had to lead the army to expel the French from Vietnam. At each uncertain stage of the revolution he was dealing with an evolving level of capability and understanding, or maturity in position, within his support base. Similarly, he faced an evolving balance of prioritisation between task and the development of this support base. To lead effectively within these conditions Giap had to determine the relationship between task and subordinate requirements to achieve his goals. The SLM provides a guide for predictive leader behaviour in such situational environments and is therefore a suitable tool to assist the assessment of Giapââ¬â¢s operational effectiveness. 22 A CRiTiCAL ANALySiS OF ThE OPERATiONAL PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL VO NGUyEN GiAP 1940ââ¬â1954 Figure 1: Hersey Blanchard Situational Leadership Model36 VO NGUYEN GIAPââ¬âA SITUATIONAL LEADER 18. There are clear parallels between Giapââ¬â¢s operational success and SLM predictions. During the ââ¬Ëcontentionââ¬â¢ stage of the revolution he directly oversaw the raising and training of guerilla units, and then commanded them. His aim was to build independent guerilla ââ¬Ëcellsââ¬â¢ that would in turn motivate the development of new cells of their own accord. His style during this period was carefully tailored to his audience, and the requirements of the task. To achieve this he lived amongst the guerillas, suffered their hardships, and led them during dangerous operations. He introduced tactical procedures that enhanced their survivability and their effectiveness, earning their trust, and demonstrating the potential impact their cells could have on the French occupiers. 7 This ââ¬Ëtellingââ¬â¢ and ââ¬Ësellingââ¬â¢ behaviour increased support for resistance against the French dramatically. As their capability developed, regional operations were raised utilising the local knowledge of the new guerillas. This ââ¬Ëparticipationââ¬â¢ behaviour evolved into ââ¬Ëdelegationââ¬â¢ as individual cells and regions graduated to operations without direct input from Giap. 38 His operations were successful in achieving very large-scale support quickly, and in achieving the ââ¬Ëequilibriumââ¬â¢ stage of revolution. 39 19. In 1954, during the final ââ¬Ëcounteroffensiveââ¬â¢ stage, Giap enjoyed probably his most famous operational success. His defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu was the final factor in the withdrawal of French occupation40 and demonstrated a number of situational leadership behaviours. Firstly he conducted complicated diversionary operations that involved his whole force. Elements of his conventional force conducted manoeuvre, supported by ââ¬Ëtellingââ¬â¢ behaviour, his guerilla forces conducted harassing operations, supported by ââ¬Ëparticipationââ¬â¢ and ââ¬Ëdelegationââ¬â¢ behaviour and his regional forces conducted general disruption operations, supported by ââ¬Ëdelegationââ¬â¢ behaviour. 41 Giapââ¬â¢s decision to stall his attack on Dien Bien Phu to conduct dditional preparation of his soldiers and officers is further evidence of Giapââ¬â¢s effective situational leadership. 42 He recognised that their 23 GEDDES PAPERS 2005 ââ¬Ëmaturityââ¬â¢ in the conduct of deliberate attacks was low, and so he engaged in ââ¬Ësellingââ¬â¢ behaviour. He also demonstrate d this behaviour during the assault, taking opportunity to reinforce, and ââ¬Ësellââ¬â¢ before continuing. Situational leadership supported the ââ¬Ëcounteroffensiveââ¬â¢ stage of the revolution. 43 The SLM complicated 20. Interestingly Giap had applied similar leadership methods in 1951 during the first attempt at a ââ¬Ëcounteroffensiveââ¬â¢, but had failed. In his attack on Vinh Yen he did not dislodge the French forces44 and sustained very heavy casualties. 45 He again failed to defeat the French in his next two set battles when attempting to clear the Red River Delta at Mao Khe in March, and along the Day River in June. 46 He has been strongly criticised for his decision-making during those battles. Whilst in isolation this could indicate a poor match with situational leadership, Giapââ¬â¢s own tactical skills at that early stage were still evolving. 47 He had experienced smaller battles and succeededââ¬âbut these clashes were his first real pitched battles. Giapââ¬â¢s operational success had not been determined by his leadership method and he had made grave errors in judgement. 48 21. There are two additional influences relating to Giapââ¬â¢s command that had an impact on Giapââ¬â¢s leadership effectiveness. Significantly, the war against the French was part of a wider revolution. From the outset Ho Chi Minh understood that the only way to unite the diverse and independent natures amongst peasant populations was through ideology. The Vietminh was created by the Communist Party, and ultimately led by it. 9 The structure of the army supported the Partyââ¬â¢s ambitions as well, demonstrating an evolution as each stage of the revolution was achieved, and facilitated participation of the whole population at each stage. 50 Lower leadership within the Vietminh was largely democratic and imbued with communist ideals, similar to village cooperation,51 and the line between the political and military leadership was blurred for both the leaders themselves as well as the population as a whole. 52 Within such an environment it could be difficult to separate Giapââ¬â¢s personal influence and that of the surrounding idealism. 22. The second dditional influence on Giapââ¬â¢s leadership effectiveness was his own nature. Whilst throughout the considerable period in which Giap led the Vietnamese forces against the French he demonstrated substantial agility in his dealings with others, he was a communist first and commander second. It is highly likely that his passion for his cause was a considerable influence in many of his decisions to commit his forces, particularly when on the brink of failure. He was also an extremely ambitious individual who saw all of his peers as possible threats, and recognised that achieving successful results was a means of his own survival. To an ambitious man such incentive must have been a considerable factor throughout his command. 53 23. It is clear that the Hersey-Blanchard SLM cannot take into account all factors that influenced Giapââ¬â¢s leadership effectiveness over the period of concern. It is, however, useful in explaining Giapââ¬â¢s approaches to leadership during much of his operational experience. Conclusion 24. The aim of this paper was to examine the operational performance of General Vo Nguyen Giap in terms of his leadership performance. Giap experienced his greatest successes during his guerilla struggle and the battle for Dien Bien Phu. However, his leadership effectiveness should also be measured against his failures. His losses at Vin Yehn, Red River, and Day River were dramatic, and typified a piecemeal approach to command. He made grave personal errors. It is possible that these errors could be attributed to his lack of experience as a commander, or his idealistic and political 24 A CRiTiCAL ANALySiS OF ThE OPERATiONAL PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL VO NGUyEN GiAP 1940ââ¬â1954 nature, but it is unlikely to have been the misapplication of situational leadership. Indeed it is possible that because of heavy and continual indoctrination, Giapââ¬â¢s actual influence over the Vietminh was more political than martial. Each of these factors complicate the examination of Giapââ¬â¢s leadership effectiveness using the SLM. 25. When considering Giapââ¬â¢s successes, however, Hersey-Blanchardââ¬â¢s SLM can be utilised quite successfully. During his guerilla years Giap transited through S1 to S4 behaviours, ultimately relying on independent action within respective regions. Similarly, his mix of behaviours in relation to the diverse forces e utilised at Dien Bien Phu allowed the strengths of each element to add to his overall operational performance. In these instances the SLM indicates that Giap led his forces effectively. His operational successes, and ultimate campaign success indicate that he was, on balance, an effective commander and leader. 25 GEDDES PAPERS 2005 Endnotes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. R. Stetler (ed. ), ââ¬ËIntroductionââ¬â¢ in General Vo Nguyen,TheMilitaryArtofPeopleââ¬â¢sWar:SelectedWritingsofGeneral VoNguyenGiap, UMI, Michigan, 1988, p. 11. Major General R. L. Clutterbuck, ââ¬ËGeneral Giap: An Assessmentââ¬â¢, TheArmyQuarterlyandDefenceJournal, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 1994, p. 333. D. Miller, ââ¬ËGeneral Giap: The Career of this Outstanding Communist Generalââ¬â¢, WarMonthly, Vol. 9(6), 1981, pp. 1ââ¬â2. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), VietnamatWar:TheHistory:1946ââ¬â1975, Sidgewick and Jackson, London, 1989, pp. 12ââ¬â3. An-Xa, like most other villages in the nation, was essentially self-contained. Landowners, tenants, and individuals that supplied other necessary services concentrated around the water sources that fed their rice paddies and animals. Perhaps because of this genesis each village also enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy from national interference. Individuals instead were compelled to act in the interest of communities because of the intrinsic requirements each had of the other, and the community of all individuals. These local requirements were enforced by a system of village elders. B. B. Fall, ââ¬ËVo Nguyen Giap: Man and Mythââ¬â¢, in General V. N. Giap, Peopleââ¬â¢sWarPeopleââ¬â¢sArmy:TheVietCong InsurrectionManualforUnderdevelopedCountries, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1962, p. xxix. Giap found parallels between Confucian teachings and communism. He felt that ideals within both teachings saw society and individuals blending seamlessly. S. Karnow, Vietnam,AHistory, Pimlico, London, 1994, p. 155. R. Stetler (ed. ), op. cit. , p. 13. Giapââ¬â¢s journey to command of the communist forces began with his interest in revolution. Whilst still a youth he joined clandestine political groups, and formed close associations with revolutionaries from the previous generation. His own stature increased significantly and in the 1930s began filling functional roles within underground movements. He was eventually arrested and jailed by the French for his political activity. Released, he later joined Ho Chi Minhââ¬â¢s newly formed Vietnam Communist Party. Local party officials selected Giap to travel to China to meet with Ho Chi Minh and undergo military training. Ho Chi Minh was impressed with Giapââ¬â¢s potential, tasking him, amongst others, to aid in the raising of Guerilla forces to support the revolution. His subsequent successes led to his appointment to command the communist forces throughout the revolution. S. Karnow, op. cit. ,pp. 156ââ¬â7. ibid, pp. 19ââ¬â24. Giap was a focused and dedicated instructor. He delivered enthusiastic accounts of past battles to his young students with a particular weight on his own interpretation of the tactical and strategic determinations of his subjects. C. B. Currey, VictoryatanyCost:TheGeniusofVietnamââ¬â¢sGeneralVoNguyenGiap, Brasseys, London, 1997, pp. 34ââ¬â5. R. Stetler (ed. ), op. cit. , p. 104. S. Karnow, op. cit. ,p. 157. The main focus of these small groups was ambushing, and laying crude traps. Despite the lack of concentrated effect such activity had a significant detrimental effect on French morale as time wore on. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), op. cit. , p. 8. S. Karnow, op. cit. ,p. 157. ibid. Ho Chi Minh had been imprisoned in 1942 by Chiang Kai-shek. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),TheVietnamWar:TheHistoryof Americaââ¬â¢s Conflict in South East Asia, Salamander Books Pty Ltd, London, 1996, p. 0. J. Dalloz, TheWarinIndo-China1945ââ¬â54, Gill and Macmillian, Dublin, 1990, pp. 98ââ¬â9. Giap was clearly instructed by Ho Chi Minh that the attacks ââ¬Ëmustââ¬â¢ be successful. This type of influence must have been felt by Giap throughout the campaign. S. Karnow, op. cit. ,p. 157. When the Japanese overturned Fr ench rule they failed to dominate the northern reaches of Vietnam. This allowed Giap and his cadre to move unfettered to spread the revolutionary word and train new recruits. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), op. cit. , p. 22. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 26 A CRiTiCAL ANALySiS OF ThE OPERATiONAL PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL VO NGUyEN GiAP 1940ââ¬â1954 21. 22. 23. D. Miller, op. cit. , p. 2. ibid. The French lost 60 per cent of their forces stationed in the region who were either casualties or captured. Significantly they lost considerable arms and munitions including 125 mortars and 13 guns, dramatic force multipliers for Giapââ¬â¢s own use. B. C. Nalty (ed. ), op. cit. , p. 44. Giapââ¬â¢s Vietminh had become substantially more professional and capable as a result of formal training for junior leaders and officers provided by both Chinese officers and later within the Vietminhââ¬â¢s own schools. Capability and effectiveness were also considerably enhanced with the continued provision of Chinese weapon systems as his force grew. It was later estimated that Giap lost between 6000 and 9000 killed and up to 8000 wounded. He also had over 600 of his soldiers taken prisoner. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),op. cit. , p. 44. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),op. cit. , p. 45. The French had considerable defences in place. Seventeen battalions of infantry, three regiments of Artillery, and a tank element defended the position. Defences were divided into separate but supporting strong points that had been hardened considerably. The position had its own air support, and maintained substantial reserves. M. ElliotBateman, Defeat in the East: The Mark of Mao Tse Tung on War, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 194. M. Elliot-Bateman, ibid. , pp. 194ââ¬â5. It is difficult however to entirely distinguish his effect from that of revolutionary momentum. ibid. , pp. 164ââ¬â9. As an historian Giap had studied many military commanders and great battles. His greatest influence however was his experience. He was a constant adaptor who learned every possible lesson from his failures. J. Roy, TheBattleof DienBienPhu, Harper and Row, New York, 1965. The willingness of Giapââ¬â¢s soldiers to fight in extremely grim conditions was perhaps best represented at Dien Bien Phu. It was during this battle that Giap had to slow his advance because of his soldiersââ¬â¢ concerns about the rate of effort and high levels of casualties. Whether he was concerned for their welfare, however, is considered unlikely given his previous management of ââ¬Ëwaveââ¬â¢ assaults. He did however understand the requirement to listen to his soldiers to forestall mutinous reactions so he could still achieve his goal. At Dien Bien Phu he changed his plans dramatically to ensure greater survivablity, and later slowed his advance to reinforce. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),op. cit. , p. 51. Task behaviours focus more on specifying the what, who, how and when of an objective. Relationship behaviours focus more on the leader supporting subordinates toward an outcome through effective communication and facilitation. For more see R. Hughes, R. Ginnett, G. Curphy, Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, 3rd Ed, Irwin McGraw-Hill, Singapore, 1999, p. 58ââ¬â9. ibid. , p. 58. R. L. Daft, Management, 5th Ed. , The Dryden Press, USA, 2000, p. 515. ibid. P. Hersey, K. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behaviour ââ¬â Utilizing Human Resources, 6th Edition, Prentice-Hall International, New Jersey, 1993, p. 207. S. Karnow, op. cit. ,p. 157. ibid. , pp. 157ââ¬â8. D. Miller, op. cit. , p. 2. Combined successfully with strategic effects. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),op. cit. , p. 51. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), op. cit. , pp. 178ââ¬â80. H. R. Simpson, ââ¬ËA Conversation with Gen. Giapââ¬â¢, Army, Vol. 41, No. 9, Sept 1991, p. 50. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), op. cit. , pp. 178ââ¬â80. The French had learned from their recent losses and incorporated their Air Force successfully into the defence. Giapââ¬â¢s two divisions were repelled mainly through the use of napalm. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),op. cit. , p. 44. 27 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. GEDDES PAPERS 2005 45. 46. 47. It was later estimated that Giap lost between 6000 and 9000 killed and up to 8000 wounded. He also had over 600 of his soldiers taken prisoner. B. C. Nalty (ed. ),op. cit. , p. 44. At Mao Khe the French staged an extremely strong defence which Giapââ¬â¢s mass attacks could not penetrate. Along the Day River Giap overextended his forces and failed to maintain reserves. B. C. Nalty (ed. ,op. cit. , p. 45. It has been argued that he failed to capitalise on opportunity, was inflexible in his plan, and critically had not thought of the value air and sea capability added to the French defences. Giap learned many lessons from these failures. Whilst he remained committed to Chinese models of warfare, particularly the characteristics of concentration of force and firepower, he considered the tactics of his enemy more carefully. He realised that large scale attacks within French controlled areas, especially when close to support bases, allowed the French to defeat Giapââ¬â¢s numerical superiority. J. Dalloz, op. cit. , pp. 138ââ¬â9. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), op. cit. , pp. 123ââ¬â6. This was made abundantly clear to soldiers and ââ¬Ëeducationallyââ¬â¢ reinforced on a continual basis. It was often reinforced by French response to Giapââ¬â¢s operations. For example in 1950 the French introduced laws involving gaol for Vietnamese proven to have had an adverse affect on military moral, or delayed the movement of military equipment. This led to the jailing of a number of popular Vietnamese individuals, and easy propaganda targets for the communists. J. Dalloz, op. cit. , pp. 121ââ¬â2. The Vietminh was structured from the base level up. In keeping with revolutionary measures everyone in every village had a role to play. The best of the ââ¬Ëself defenceââ¬â¢ forces within each village became guerillas, the next tier of force. These units were regionally coordinated, but only trained periodically. They were based from their village. They were capable of an element of concerted effort but really existed to assist main force units in diversionary efforts. The best guerillas were recruited to Giapââ¬â¢s main force. J. Dalloz, op. cit. , pp. 121ââ¬â2. R. Stetler (ed. ), op. cit. , pp. 10ââ¬â2. For example Giap had been a vocal agitator, and an active representative on urban and rural issues well before his appointment on the Vietminh. G. Porter, Vietnam:ThePoliticsofBureaucraticSocialism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 83. Giap had to fight off challenges to his position as commander of the Vietminh in the early stages of its devel opment, and these types of conflicts were to continue to plague him for the rest of his long military career, as successful as he was in dealing with them. Lt. Gen. P. B. Davidson (Retd), op. cit. , pp. 12ââ¬â3. 48. 49. 0. 51. 52. 53. 28 A CRiTiCAL ANALySiS OF ThE OPERATiONAL PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL VO NGUyEN GiAP 1940ââ¬â1954 Bibliography Clutterbuck, Major General R. L. , ââ¬ËGeneral Giap : An Assessmentââ¬â¢, TheArmyQuarterlyandDefenceJournal, Vol. 124, No. 3, July 1994. Currey, C. B. , VictoryatanyCost:TheGeniusofVietnamââ¬â¢sGeneralVoNguyenGiap, Brasseys, London, 1997. Daft, R. L. , Management, 5th Ed. , The Dryden Press, USA, 2000. Dalloz, J. , TheWarinIndo-China1945ââ¬â54, Gill and Macmillian, Dublin, 1990. Davidson, Lt. Gen. P. B. , (Retd), VietnamatWar:TheHistory:1946ââ¬â1975, Sidgewick and Jackson, London, 1989. Elliot-Bateman, M. , Defeat in the East: The Mark of Mao Tse Tung on War, Oxford University Press, London, 1967. Fall, B. B. , ââ¬ËVo Nguyen Giap: Man and Mythââ¬â¢, in General V. N. Giap, Peopleââ¬â¢s War Peopleââ¬â¢s Army: The Viet Cong InsurrectionManualforUnderdevelopedCountries, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1962. Hersey P. , Blanchard K. , ManagementofOrganizationalBehaviourââ¬âUtilizingHumanResources,6th Edition, PrenticeHall International, New Jersey. Karnow, S. , Vietnam,AHistory, Pimlico, London, 1994. Miller, D. , ââ¬ËGeneral Giap: The Career of this Outstanding Communist Generalââ¬â¢, WarMonthly, Vol. (6), 1981. Nalty, B. C. (ed. ), The Vietnam War : The History of Americaââ¬â¢s Conflict in South East Asia, Salamander Books Pty Ltd, London, 1996. Porter, G. , Vietnam:ThePoliticsofBureaucraticSocialism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993. Roy, J. , TheBattleofDienBienPhu, Harper and Row, New York, 1965. Simpson, H. R. , ââ¬ËA Conversat ion with Gen. Giapââ¬â¢, Army, Vol. 41, No. 9, Sept 1991. Stetler, R. (ed. ), ââ¬ËIntroductionââ¬â¢, in General Vo Nguyen,TheMilitaryArtofPeopleââ¬â¢sWar:SelectedWritingsofGeneralVo NguyenGiap, UMI, Michigan, 1988. 29
Tuesday, May 5, 2020
Child Abuse Laws Essay Example For Students
Child Abuse Laws Essay Child abuse is a social problem that affects millions of children each year. Not only does child abuse have multiple societal repercussions, but also individual repercussions that produce lifelong scars. There are many forms of child abuse; sexual, physical, verbal, and emotional. Some of the facts presented in this paper will be painful to absorb. That does not change the fact that these problems must be addressed. It has been reported that one out of three girls, and one out of seven boys are sexually abused by the time they reach the age of 18. The most prevalent form of child sexual abuse is now recognized to be, incest. A study that showed approximately 27% of the women in every state of the union, and 16% of the men said they had been sexually abused as children. Child Abuse Laws Child abuse. Two words that should never have to be seen side by side. Yet, child abuse is very much a reality in this world. Abuse Laws Child abuse. Two words that should never have to be seen side by side. Yet, child abuse is very much a reality in this world. Unfortunately, to wish otherwise would be the same as to wish for a perfect world. We must do the best that we can as a society with the power of laws on our side to help the innocent young victims of child abuse. We have a responsibility as human beings to do all that we can for these children. Some of us fulfill this responsibility by promoting awareness, some by donating time, money, or services, some by getting laws passed, and some by enforcing laws that protect children from all kinds of abuse. The purpose of this study was to research child abuse from all angles to try to understand what we as a society may be doing wrong also what we may be doing right to help the young victims of child abuse. To look at all types of studies compare them try to break them down to better understand them. The first things that should be understood are; the characteristics of the offenders, the types of offenses, some of the societal issues that are listed as possible causes of child abuse. Studies show that the characteristics of sexual abuse offenders are; dependent, inadequate individuals with early family histories characterized by conflict, disruption, abandonment, abuse, and exploitation. In 1997, over 3 million children were reported for child abuse and neglect to child protective service agencies in the U.S.. These figures have gone up from year to year approximately 1. 7% per year. Since 1985, the rate of child abuse fatalities has increased by 34%. Of these fatalities, 78% were children under the age of 5. 38% were under one year of age. The top 6 causes of child abuse listed were: 1. Drug addiction 2. Poverty 3. A violent society 4. A lack of community ties 5. A family history of violence 6. Lack of parenting skills. METHOD The information obtained in this research paper was drawn mostly from various internet web-sites. I read all of the pertinent issues related to this topic. All sides of the issue were accounted for. For example; stories, facts, figures as they are told by adults, the children, law enforcers, law makers, the accused, the falsely accused etc. This information then had to be sorted out according to what was fact, and what was opinion. I was looking mostly for law related issues, and I received a lot of other valuable pieces of information along the way. I pieced the information together in a way that I felt would make sense to a reader who was trying to get a good general understanding about Child Abuse Laws Essay. Their contributions to the modern world Essay LITERATURE REVIEW / CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS One valuable source of information pertained to the American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law (established in 1978). Its mission was to try to help improve childrens lives through advances in law, justice, knowledge, practice, and public policy. Its work includes such jobs as; strengthening laws, policies, and judicial procedures affecting children, and increasing public awareness of law and justice related to children. The center has also taken on such projects as, removing barriers to the termination of parental rights and helping courts to improve child protection case handling practices. They also pledged to work to establish clear standards for attorneys in the representation of children, parents, and child protection agencies in child abuse and neglect cases. Also, to persuade legislature to strengthen the representation of children, parents, and child protection agencies in child abuse and neglect cases. According to the ABA Division of .
Monday, April 13, 2020
Chapters 23
While focusing on Part IV ââ¬Å"The Doctrine of the Word of Godâ⬠and Part V ââ¬Å"The Doctrine of the Knowledge of Godâ⬠from John Frameââ¬â¢s Systematic Theology, it is possible to note that these parts are helpful to understand how people perceive Godââ¬â¢s Word and how they form their knowledge of God. This reflection paper provides the proper discussion of key points learnt from Chapters 23-32 of Frameââ¬â¢s book.Advertising We will write a custom critical writing sample on Chapters 23-32 in John Frameââ¬â¢s ââ¬Å"Systematic Theologyâ⬠specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Part IV of the book is titled as ââ¬Å"The Doctrine of the Word of Godâ⬠, and the ways to receive, perceive, and understand Godââ¬â¢s words are discussed in Chapters 23-28. I have learnt from Chapter 23 ââ¬Å"God and His Wordâ⬠that the divine word is not only in the written or verbal form, but it is in the acts. Thus , the Word is the attribute of God, and this idea is closely associated with such important phenomena as creation and providence1. Those people who have learnt the Word of God are not the same anymore. Chapter 24 ââ¬Å"God Speaks to Us in Events and Wordsâ⬠provides more details to understand the fact. Thus, I have learnt that there are many ways in which the Word comes to people, and they are human words or historic events, and natural events. These ways are the media for revelation2. It is stated in Chapter 25 ââ¬Å"Godââ¬â¢s Written Wordsâ⬠that the prophets who heard the divine voice represented their knowledge in the written word. From this point, it is also the direct Word from God. Referring to Chapter 26 ââ¬Å"The Nature of Scriptureâ⬠, I can state that Godââ¬â¢s Word is truth in its nature because the principles of infallibility and inerrancy are followed in Scripture3. Now, I understand that I can discuss Scripture as the reflection of Godââ¬â¢s direct words. Chapter 27 ââ¬Å"From Godââ¬â¢s Lips to Our Earsâ⬠and Chapter 28 ââ¬Å"From the Text to Our Heartsâ⬠are very interesting and important for me because they present the information on the ways of receiving and understanding Godââ¬â¢s Word. I received the opportunity to understand that Godââ¬â¢s Word comes directly to prophets who write it, and these copies are extremely important for believers. Although many autographs are lost, God uses many media to come to the personââ¬â¢s heart4. I can guess that the reason is in the fact that Scripture includes the message that comes directly to the believerââ¬â¢s heart and mind. I have learnt from Part V ââ¬Å"The Doctrine of the Knowledge of Godâ⬠how God and person can know each other. In Chapter 29 ââ¬Å"God and Our Knowledgeâ⬠, it is stated that God knows everyone in spite of the personalityââ¬â¢s aspects. Thus, there are many perspectives from which God can see the person.Advertising Looking for critical writing on religion theology? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More That is why, there are no ideas or acts which can be unnoticed. Our knowledge of God is more limited, but we need to know more about God in order to learn more about us. In Chapters 30-32, there are ideas on how people can learn more about God5. I have learnt that the human heart, mind, intuition, and imagination are the strong sources to learn more about God and to understand the revelation principle. There are many important facts presented in Chapters 23-32 of John Frameââ¬â¢s Systematic Theology which provide the important framework to conclude about Godââ¬â¢s Word and the roots of the knowledge. The chapters provided me with the opportunity to understand how the persons can learn more about their nature and the nature of God. Furthermore, I have realized that the knowledge of God and the knowledge of a man are interconnected, and th e most important information associated with the divine word can come with the help of the human words, written words, and natural and historic events. Bibliography Frame, John. Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief. USA: PR Publishing, 2013. Footnotes 1 John Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief (USA: PR Publishing, 2013), 520. 2 Frame, Systematic Theology, 536. 3 Ibid., 596.Advertising We will write a custom critical writing sample on Chapters 23-32 in John Frameââ¬â¢s ââ¬Å"Systematic Theologyâ⬠specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More 4 Frame, Systematic Theology, 638. 5 Ibid., 739. This critical writing on Chapters 23-32 in John Frameââ¬â¢s ââ¬Å"Systematic Theologyâ⬠was written and submitted by user Sophie Frye to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.
Sunday, April 12, 2020
Sample Essay About Information Management - Introduce the Concept to Your Students
Sample Essay About Information Management - Introduce the Concept to Your StudentsA sample essay about information management can be used in a very simple way for introductory courses in the information management field. You will be introduced to how the various concepts are utilized to manage information as well as explain how the information system can be used to solve problems. It will also provide some examples of using the tools needed to use the information system, like the OSPF (Open Shortest Path First). A sample essay can serve as a wonderful introduction to information management.A sample essay about information management is not meant to be written in such a way that it seems like an academic paper. In fact, most students will prefer to just read the essays and talk about them as they listen to the teacher. To make a simple introduction to information management, an example can be used to introduce some of the most important concepts.A basic concept in information manageme nt is the domain or the particular set of information that one needs to manage in their organizations. This information may be some documents or a large number of materials. For example, a large amount of research data may be required in order to determine the cause of a disease.There are different ways to store this information and different ways to retrieve it. This example is basically the organization's software to store information and retrieve it.The concept of a domain is very important. Different domains have different needs. It may be a medical journal to show diagnosis, financial reports to show income and expenditures and so on. The computer software can store and retrieve the data in different ways, so it can be linked to a specific domain.This is just a very simple example of the concept of information management. If you are a student in school, the concept may be a bit more complex. A sample essay can be used as a guide to help the student understand what information m anagement is all about. It can even show how a simple IT infrastructure can be designed so that the organization can take advantage of all the available resources to maintain the information.A sample essay about information management can help you as a student to learn more about information management. It can help you understand the importance of taking advantage of all the information that is available. The sample can also give you a taste of how a customized information management system can be used. Of course, once the sample has been used, your assignments should use that knowledge as well.
Wednesday, March 11, 2020
Gettysburg Address essays
Gettysburg Address essays When and Where were the Gettysburg Address given? The speech was delivered by Abraham Lincoln on Nov. 19, 1863, at the dedication of the national cemetery on the Civil War battlefield of Gettysburg, Pa. How did the Gettysburg Address come to be? For three days in July of 1863, Union and Confederate forces fought fierce battles at and near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The Union turned back one of the last major thrusts of the Confederate troops toward the North. Many consider it the turning point in the war; after Gettysburg, the South had to fight a defensive war that was doomed to fail. On November 20 of that same year, a battlefield cemetery was dedicated at Gettysburg. Edward Everett, a well-regarded and prominent speaker, was the main feature of the event. President Lincoln followed Everett's two hour speech with what came to be known as the Gettysburg Address. In about two minutes, Lincoln gave his speech; though the newspapers of the time had much to say about Everett's speech and relegated Lincoln to the back pages, Everett himself recognized the beauty of the simple elegance of Lincoln's words, and told the President as much in a note he wrote to him the next day. How many drafts of the Gettysburg Address were there and where are they now? Of the five known manuscript copies of the Gettysburg Address, the Library of Congress has two. President Lincoln gave one of these to each of his two private secretaries, John Nicolay and John Hay. The copy on exhibit, which belonged to Nicolay, is often called the " first draft" because it is believed to be the earliest copy that exists. Debate continues about whether the Nicolay copy is the "reading" copy. In 1894 Nicolay wrote that Lincoln had brought with him the first part of the speech, written in ink on Executive Mansion stationery, and that he had written the second page in pencil on lined paper before the dedication on November 19, 1863. Matching folds are still evident ...
Monday, February 24, 2020
Control room, summary Movie Review Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words
Control room, summary - Movie Review Example The movie begins with a western music which signifies that when two different cultured music can co exist in movies, then both the societies can live together in harmony. When the war begins, the film is taken in the place where all the major news sources work out like CNN, Fox etc. The movie initially begins in an orthodox way at the headquarters in Qatar which shows Muslim men with their headgear watching the television monitor where President Bush gives final warnings to Saddam Hussein for a war which gives us the perfect images of the Arabian culture. The movie features many staff from Al Jazeera but the two most compelling staff is Samir Khader, the general manager running al Jazeera, and Hassan Ibrahim, a reporter for al Jazeera.à This image of Arabian culture begins to crumble when Hassan Ibrahim tells that he has tremendous faith in the American institution. Blood, images of Dead bodies, wounded people and bullets everywhere is one of the different perspectives of war which Control room brings to the viewers. Such images are usually not present in a documentary and encourage negative thoughts in the viewers. Wars are always a negative effect on the people. Showing live images of dead people depicts negative images of the countries to the viewers. It has also been termed as the ââ¬Å"Osama bin ladenââ¬â¢s mouthpieceâ⬠. However though, Al Jazeera does not show all the information. It does not report and focus on the dead American civilians or American coffins. However, it is not just Al Jazeera broadcasting one type of images, Fox news also display one sided images. Control room tells us how difficult it is to provide unbiased images when working in media. Everyone wants their nation to win in moral values and that is what the news networks broadcast. This is one place where the movie gives a bad impression of how wars are covere d by the media. War is hell and media plays a major role in the success or loss of that war. Since people sitting at home can
Friday, February 7, 2020
Business Research Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words
Business Research - Essay Example The research will use a qualitative method to gather data and focus groups will be mainly used for this particular case. This proposal is expected to be complete within a time frame of about two weeks. Topshop is the most influential brand in the British Fashion community and it has distinguished itself through offering popular range of clothing, accessories and makeup and a portfolio of successful product-led marketing initiatives such as Topshop Unique and Kate Moss Design Collaboration (Joyn, 2011). The success of Topshop is not an end in itself since it is still poised for growth. As such, this research proposal has been design to establish the strategies that can be implemented by this shop in its bid to expand to overseas markets. It is important that research has to be carried out so as to be in a position to successfully establish business in a global environment. The paper is divided into various categories which are meant to highlight the stages involved in carrying out this particular research. Organizations operating in a global market ought to take a holistic approach in order for them to operate effectively. The global environment is characterized by various market forces such as competition as well as consumer choice among other factors (Everard & Burrow, 1996). Though Topshop has successfully managed to establish itself as a force to reckon with in the UK fashion industry, this might not be the case in overseas markets since they are not synonymous with the UK market. As such, this study is justified since it seeks to investigate the market forces that can affect the viability of businesses in different markets. The research is also valuable given that it helps the responsible authorities at the above mentioned shop to make informed decisions about the strategies that can be implemented in order for it to penetrate new overseas market. The research is also going to create a body of knowledge that can be used for academic purposes in as far
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)